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Preschoolers Understand and Generate Pretend Actions Using Object Substitution 1 
Pretend play is considered to be an imaginative or creative activity (e.g., Fehr & Russ, 2 
2016; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Hoffmann & Russ, 2016; Russ, Robins, & Christiano, 3 
1999; Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009). Yet past experimental 4 
research focused on whether children imitate pretense, follow instructions to pretend, or 5 
XQGHUVWDQGRWKHUV¶SUHWHQVH (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Hopkins, Smith, Weisberg, & 6 
Lillard, 2016; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004, 2006; Wyman, et al., 2009). Thus, we 7 
FDQQRWEHVXUHWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VSUHWHQVHLVLQIDFWnovel, or whether they simply copy or 8 
IROORZVRWKHUV¶LQVWUXFWLRQVSome experimental work has attempted to capWXUHFKLOGUHQ¶V9 
novel pretense (Nielsen & Christie, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2004). However, we argue that 10 
what looked like novel pretense in these studies could be explained by deferred imitation. 11 
This is the first experiment to show preschoolers create their own novel object substitutions, 12 
without relying on deferred imitation. 13 
Generating Object Substitutions 14 
Pretend play differs from functional play as the actions performed during pretend play 15 
are technically incorrect (e.g., drinking from empty cup, talking to banana; Hoicka & Gattis, 16 
2008; Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka & Martin, 2016). One form of pretend play, 17 
object substitution, requires temporarily suppressing the typical action for the object while 18 
performing an action that is typical for another object (e.g., pretending banana is phone; 19 
Tomasello, Striano, & Rochat, 1999). 20 
Naturalistic research suggests children perform object substitution during free play 21 
from 2 years (e.g., Belsky & Most, 1981; McCune-Nicolich, 1981). However, these studies 22 
do not provide information on the content of their play. Additionally, it is difficult to 23 
determine ZKHWKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VREMHFWVXEVWLWXWLRQs are generated by children themselves, or 24 
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whether they are copied from others (immediately after observation, or using deferred 1 
imitation; see Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012).  2 
Experimental research suggests 2- to 3-year-olds perform object substitutions (e.g., 3 
Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Hopkins, et al., 2016; Wyman, et al., 2009). In a typical pretense 4 
experiment, the experimenter performed a pretend action (e.g., feeding a toy monkey a 5 
banana, in which the banana was a yellow block), after which the child was asked to perform 6 
WKHVDPHDFWLRQ³<RXJLYHWKHPRQNH\VRPHEDQDQD´; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993, 7 
experiment 2). Most children successfully produced object substitution (brought the yellow 8 
block to the monkey¶VPRXWKTherefore, while demonstrating that 2-year-olds can imitate 9 
object substitutions, this does not tell us whether children can generate their own object 10 
substitutions. 11 
Some studies found children generate object substitutions when the experimenter has 12 
not modeled the pretend action (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993, experiments 3 and 4; 13 
Hopkins et al., 2016, study 1). However, in these studies, experimenters gave specific verbal 14 
prompts to do specific pretend actions. For example, Hopkins, et al. (2016) gave 3- to 5-year-15 
olds objects that were different in shape and function to the target pretend object (e.g., using a 16 
ball to pretend to write). They then said, e.g., ³Pretend that you are ZULWLQJZLWKWKLV´7KH17 
majority of children successfully performed pretend actions correctly, showing a model was 18 
not required. However, children did not invent their own object substitutions, but instead 19 
acted out those invented by the experimenter. 20 
One study attempted to examine novel object substitutions directly. Nielsen and 21 
Christie (2008) asked 2- and 3-year-olds to play with a dollhouse and different toys: dolls, toy 22 
items (e.g., bed, couch, toy hamburger), and functional items (e.g., string, piece of cloth). 23 
After modeling three pretend play scenarios (e.g., using pen lid as toothbrush) children again 24 
played with the dollhouse. Children produced significantly more object substitutions after 25 
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modeling, and around half of the object substitutions were not modeled by the experimenter. 1 
However, the study does not give examples of the types of novel object substitutions 2 
performed. Therefore, if a typical object substitution was pretending some cloth was a 3 
blanket, children may have literally thought the cloth was a miniature blanket, and hence did 4 
not use object substitution. Furthermore, given that the pretend situation was likely quite 5 
familiar ± playing with a dollhouse ± those actions that looked novel to the coders may have 6 
been instances of deferred imitation (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Our first goal was to 7 
determine whether 3-year-olds generate object substitutions without relying on (deferred) 8 
imitation. 9 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ2WKHUV¶,ntentions to Pretend 10 
Understanding pretense involves understanding that while the person pretending is 11 
intentionally doing something technically wrong (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, et al., 12 
2008), the act is correct, and perhaps obligatory, in a shared imagined world (e.g., Wyman, et 13 
al., 2009). Rakoczy, et al. (2004, 2006) found 3-year-olds understood intentions to pretend 14 
during autosymbolic play (pretending with the original object, e.g., pretending to drink from 15 
empty cup). The experimenter either pretended to do an action, or tried but failed to do an 16 
action (e.g., writing with a pen that still had the cap on). Verbal and non-verbal cues indicated 17 
their intention to pretend (e.g., playful expression, sound effects), or their intention to 18 
perform the literal action (eJIUXVWUDWHGH[SUHVVLRQVWDWLQJVXUSULVHE\VD\LQJ³+PPP"´19 
They found 3-year-olds (and to some extent 2-year-olds) imitated the pretend actions while 20 
correcting the trying actions (e.g., taking cap off the pen before coloring).  21 
Since children copied actions marked as pretending, but corrected the same actions 22 
marked as trying, this suggests children distinguish intentions to pretend from mistakes 23 
(Rakoczy, et al., 2004, 2006). However, Hoicka and Akhtar (2011) argued that in these types 24 
of imitation tasks, children could be responding to the emotional cues conveyed by the 25 
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experimenters. In the studies by Rakoczy and colleagues (2004, 2006) pretend actions were 1 
accompanied by positive verbal and non-verbal cues, while trying actions were accompanied 2 
by negative verbal and non-verbal cues. Children could have imitated actions marked as 3 
pretending because they were associated with positive emotions, while avoiding actions 4 
marked as mistakes because they were associated with negative emotions.  5 
Studies have demonstrated that 3-year-olds do likely understand the intention behind 6 
pretense. Three-year-olds go beyond imitating autosymbolic pretend scenarios, adding their 7 
own details, so are not just copying (Rakoczy, et al., 2004). However, it is also possible that 8 
since these were familiar pretense scenarios (eating, drinking) children used deferred 9 
imitation. More convincingly, 3-year-olds not only copy object substitutions, but also protest 10 
when others use the object for its original use (Wyman, et al., 2009), suggesting a deeper 11 
understanding of intentions. Our second goal was to investigate whether 3-year-olds 12 
distinguish intentions to pretend and try when object substitution is used. If children generate 13 
novel object substitutions that were not modelled in the pretend condition, and could not 14 
easily be produced using deferred imitation, this would suggest they understood the 15 
underlying intentions. 16 
Study 1 investigated whether children (1) generate their own object substitutions 17 
without relying on (deferred) imitation or verbal prompts; and (2) distinguish intentions to 18 
pretend using object substitution from trying (but failing) to do a literal action. An 19 
experimenter showed pictures of two objects (e.g., glove, hat) and performed the action 20 
corresponding to one object with the other object (e.g., glove on head). Cues indicated 21 
intentions to pretend (e.g., smiling, sound effects), or try HJJUXQWLQJVD\LQJ³:KRRSV´; 22 
Rakoczy, et al., 2004). We expected children to pretend after pretend cues, and perform 23 
correct actions after trying cues. Furthermore, we added extension trials (Hoicka & Akhtar, 24 
2011) in which we showed two pictures, and gave children one of the objects pictured, but 25 
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did not show children what to do, nor did we verbally explain to them what to do. We 1 
expected children to continue to create their own acts of object substitution in the pretend 2 
condition, and use the objects literally in the trying condition. A further goal of Study 1 was 3 
to determine if explicit cues helped children distinguish intentions to pretend and try better 4 
than implicit cues (Rakoczy, et al., 2006). 5 
In Study 2, we were interested in the mechanisms that might underlie generating 6 
object substitutions. We investigated whether divergent thinking and inhibitory control might 7 
XQGHUSLQFKLOGUHQ¶Vnovel object substitutions. Pretend play in naturalistic settings correlates 8 
with divergent thinking in children 4 years and older (e.g., Delvecchio, Li, Pazzagli, Lis, & 9 
Mazzeschi, 2016; Fehr & Russ, 2016; Hoffman & Russ, 2016; Kaugars & Russ, 2009; Russ, 10 
et al., 1999; Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyver & Spence, 1999). Similarly, inhibitory control is 11 
linked to structured pretend play using imitation and specific prompts in children 4 years and 12 
older (Kelly, Hammond, Dissanayake, & Ihsen, 2011), and 3-year-olds pretend more after 13 
engaging in inhibitory control tasks (Van Reet, 2015). We were interested to see if these 14 
findings replicate in 3-year-olds, who have lower levels of cognitive development (Welsh, 15 
Pennington, & Groissier, 1991), in both experimental, and free play settings. However, 16 
Hopkins and colleagues (2016) found links between object substitution during experiments 17 
and inhibitory control to be inconsistent across studies. We were also interested to discover 18 
ZKHWKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQRXUH[SHULPHQWDOWDVNZDVUHODWHGWRFKLOGUHQ¶Vpretense 19 
during free play.  20 
Study 1 21 
Study 1 investigated whether children generate object substitutions without the help 22 
of an experimenter. CKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDQH[SHULPHQWHU¶Vintentions to pretend using 23 
object substitution, or to try (and fail) to perform a literal action, was also investigated.  24 
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([SOLFLWYHUEDOLQVWUXFWLRQVFDQDLGFKLOGUHQ¶Vpretense understanding. During a 1 
training phase, Rakoczy, et al. (2006) told one group of children explicitly that a person was 2 
³SUHWHQGLQJWR´RU³WU\LQJWR´GRDFHUWDLQDFWLRQEHIRUHGRLQJWKHSUHWHQGRUWU\LQJDFWLRQV3 
Another group only received implicit cues that the person was pretending or trying (e.g., 4 
smiling, grunting, respectively), and a third group received no specific training. When 3-year-5 
olds were asked whether an action was pretending or trying during test trials, they were more 6 
likely to give a correct response when they received the explicit training than when they 7 
received the implicit training or no training. This suggests that providing children with the 8 
GLUHFWDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSUHWHQGDFWLRQDQGWKHZRUG³SUHWHQGLQJ´DLGVFKLOGUHQLQWKHLU9 
understanding of the intentionality of these actions. To determine whether explicit verbal 10 
FXHVHQKDQFHFKLOGUHQ¶Vobject substitution, we compared the responses of children who 11 
received explicit and implicit cues versus implicit cues only. 12 
Method 13 
Participants. We ran a power analysis for our most conservative statistic, the 14 
Kruskal-Wallace test, which found we required 44 children with Į = 0.05, ȕ = 0.80, and a 15 
large effect size, w = 0.5, (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). Forty-five 3- and 4-year-16 
olds (19 males, mean age = 44.7 months; range = 38-51 months; SD = 3.8 months) were 17 
randomly assigned to one of four groups: Implicit Pretending (12), Implicit Trying (11), 18 
Explicit Pretending (11), and Explicit Trying (11). Children were of similar ages across 19 
conditions (F(3,41) = .499, p = .685) and boys and girls were equally distributed. Most of the 20 
children were British and Caucasian, and parents had attained a high school diploma (21%), 21 
an undergraduate degree (28%), or a postgraduate degree (51%). Participants were recruited 22 
through local nurseries, the Glasgow Science Centre, the Edinburgh Zoo, and through posters 23 
and playgroups. Ethical approval for the project³"Pretense, behavioral cues and creativity in 24 
3.5- and 4-year-olds" was obtained by WKHSV\FKRORJ\GHSDUWPHQW¶VHWKLFVFRPPLWWHHDWWKH25 
PRESCHOOLERS GENERATE OWN OBJECT SUBSTITUTION 
7 
 
University of XXXX. Parents signed consent forms for children to participate in studies. 1 
Children could choose not to participate. 2 
Materials. Eighteen objects familiar to 3-year-olds were used. They were either 3 
household objects (e.g., toothbrush, phone) or objects that were IUHTXHQWO\XVHGLQFKLOGUHQ¶V4 
play (e.g., drum, ball; see Appendix A for a full list of objects). Pictures of the object were 5 
also used (see Appendix B). Two digital camcorders (SONY handycam) were used. 6 
Design. The between-subjects independent variables were intention (pretend, try) and 7 
cues (explicit, implicit). The within-subjects independent variable was whether actions were 8 
modeled on the objects or not (model, extension). The dependent variable was whether 9 
children demonstrated object substitution or literal actions. Objects were presented in four 10 
orders, counterbalanced across children (see Appendix A). 11 
The task consisted of four familiarization trials followed by eight test trials. The 12 
familiarization trials familiarized children with the task, and checked whether children 13 
imitated object substitutions and literal actions. The test trials were divided into two phases: a 14 
model phase (four trials), followed by an extension phase (four trials; based on Hoicka & 15 
Akhtar, 2011). The model phase allowed children to learn the rules of the game. The 16 
extension phase investigated whether children could generate object substitutions. 17 
Procedure. After a short warm-up, the child (C) sat opposite the experimenter (E) at a 18 
VPDOOFKLOGUHQ¶VWDEOHE placed a folder, containing all laminated A4 sheets with pictures, on 19 
the side of the table but within reach of C. 20 
Familiarization trials. E took out one of two objects (toy car; tub with lid) and asked 21 
C to name the object. E then showed a picture in the folder. In the literal trials the picture was 22 
identical to the object, while in the object substitution trials the picture was different to the 23 
object (e.g., picture of a tub when the car was on the table). The familiarization part consisted 24 
of four trials (performing a literal action and an object substitution with both objects). The 25 
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literal action was always performed first, followed by the object substitution, although it 1 
varied whether the car or tub was used first. Actions were identical for all children, but the 2 
explicit cues were different for the Implicit and Explicit group (see Table 1 for an overview 3 
of the cues given).  4 
 5 
Table 1.  6 
Intentional verbal cues given in the familiarization trials, separately for the Explicit and the 7 
Implicit groups. 8 
Implicit Group Explicit Group 
Object substitution 
trials 
Literal action trials Object substitution 
trials 
Literal action trials 
Stating initial intention: 
³/HW¶VXVHWKH
>REMHFW@OLNHWKLV´ 
³/HW¶VXVHWKH
[object] like WKLV´ 
³/HW¶VSUHWHQGWKDW
WKH>REMHFW@LVWKLV´ 
³/HW¶VWU\DQGXVH
the [object] like 
WKLV´ 
Reinforcing intention after action: 
No reinforcement No reinforcement ³7KHUH ³7KHUH´ 
Prompting child to respond: 
³1RZ\RXWU\´ ³1RZ\RXWU\´ ³1RZ\RXWU\´ ³1RZ\RXWU\´ 
 9 
In the Implicit group, E said, e.g., ³/HW¶VXVHWKHtub OLNHWKLV´6KHSRLQWHGDWWKHtub 10 
with the lid ZKHQVD\LQJWKHREMHFW¶VQDPHDQGSRLQWHGDWa picture of the same tub when 11 
VD\LQJWKHZRUG³WKLV´(WKHQopened the lid of the tub and closed it again, after which she 12 
gave the object to C DQGVDLG³1RZ\RXWU\´ During &¶V responses E always smiled and said 13 
³$OULJKW´UHJDUGOHVVRIZKDWWKHFKLOGGLG1H[W(VKRZHGWKHSLFWXUHRIDWR\FDUDQGVDLG14 
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³1RZOHW¶VXVHWKHWXEOLNHWKLV´(PRGHOHGµGULYLQJ¶WKHWXEDURXQGLQFLUFOHVDIWHUZKLFK1 
VKHJDYHWKHREMHFWWR&DJDLQDQGVDLG³1RZ\RXWU\´7KHVDPHSURFHGXUHZDVUHSHDWHG2 
using the toy car to perform literal or object substitution actions. 3 
Test trials: Model phase. Children were again presented with an object but this time 4 
with two pictures instead of one. One of the pictures was identical to the object. The second 5 
was a picture of an object that was very different in function from the object (see Appendix 6 
B).  7 
All children (in both Implicit and Explicit groups) received non-verbal intentional 8 
cues (Rakoczy, et al., 2004;). In the Pretend condition the implicit cues were: a positive facial 9 
expression, looking back and forth from the object to C, and producing sound effects. In the 10 
Trying condition the implicit cues were: a confused facial expression, looking continuously at 11 
WKHREMHFWDQGVWDWLQJFRQIXVLRQE\VD\LQJ³+PPP"´ 12 
Pretend condition. Children were presented with an object and two pictures, of which 13 
one was the same as the object on the table. E then performed a pretend action with the 14 
object, after which children were asked to act upon the object themselves. In the Explicit 15 
group, children were given explicit instructions to pretend, while in the Implicit group these 16 
cues were omitted (see Table 2 for an overview of the cues given to each group).  17 
In the Implicit group, E, for example, presented the child with pictures of a ball and a 18 
cup and showed the child an actual ball which was identical to the picture. She then said, 19 
³/HW¶VXVHWKHball like this´ :KHQVD\LQJWKHZRUG³WKLV´ she pointed at the picture of the 20 
cup (target picture). E then performed the action associated with that picture (i.e., bringing 21 
the ball to her mouth and tilting the object as if drinking from a cup), while making sound 22 
effects (slurping sounds; see Appendix C for the actions and sound effects for each object). E 23 
performed the action twice, waiting two seconds between the actions while looking at C with 24 
a positive facial expression. She then said³<RXVHH",ZDVXVLQJLWOLNH WKLV´ZKLOHSRLQWLQJ25 
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at the cup again. Then she gave the object to C DQGVDLG³1RZ\RXWU\´E smiled and said, 1 
³$OULJKW´ irrespective of the action C performed. 2 
 3 
Table 2.  4 
Intentional verbal cues given in the test trials, separately for the Explicit and Implicit groups. 5 
Implicit Group Explicit Group 
Pretend Condition Trying Condition Pretend Condition Trying Condition 
Stating initial intention: 
³/HW¶VXVHWKH
>REMHFW@OLNHWKLV´ 
³/HW¶VXVHWKH
>REMHFW@OLNHWKLV´ 
³/HW¶VSUHWHQGWKDW
WKH>REMHFW@LVWKLV´ 
³/HW¶VWU\DQGXVH
the [object] like WKLV´ 
Reinforcing intention after action: 
³<RXVHH",ZDV
XVLQJLWOLNHWKLV´ 
³:KRRSV,ZDVQRW
XVLQJLWOLNHWKLV´ 
³7KHUH<RXVHH",
was pretending it 
ZDVWKLV´ 
³:KRRSV,GLGLW
wrong. I was not 
XVLQJLWOLNHWKLV´ 
Prompting child to respond (Model Phase): 
³1RZ\RXWU\´ ³1RZ\RXWU\´ Now can you try and 
SUHWHQG"´ 
³&DQ\RXWU\DQGXVH
LW"´ 
Prompting child to respond (Extension Phase): 
³1RZ\RXWU\´ ³1RZ\RXWU\´ Now can you try and 
pretend? What could 
\RXSUHWHQGLWLV"´ 
³&DQ\RXWU\DQGXVH
it? How would you 
XVHLW"´ 
 6 
Trying condition. This was identical to the Pretend condition, except the target picture 7 
to which E pointed was identical to the object in her hand. Crucially, E performed the same 8 
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action as in the Pretend condition (e.g., using the ball as a cup). However, she looked 1 
continuously at the object with a confused facial expression and said³+PPP"´ 2 
In the Implicit group, E said, for example, ³/HW¶VXVHWKHball OLNHWKLV´When saying 3 
³WKLV´VKHSRLQWHGDWWKHSicture of the ball. She then put the ball to her mouth and tilted it as 4 
if drinking from a cup. After performing this wrong (trying) action she pointed at the picture 5 
of the ball again DQGVDLG³:KRRSV,ZDVQRWXVLQJLWOLNHWKLV1RZ\RXWU\´ E again 6 
smiled DQGVDLG³$OULJKW´ irrespective of the action C performed.  7 
Test trials: Extension phase. In the extension phase, E did not model any actions. She 8 
again presented C with an object and two pictures (one identical to the object, the other very 9 
different in function to the object). To the children in the Implicit group VKHVDLG³1RZ\RX10 
WU\´7R the children in the Explicit group, in the Pretend condition she said³1RZFDQ\RX11 
pretend? What could you preWHQGLWLV"´DQGLQWKH7U\LQJFondition, ³1RZFDQ\RXWU\DQG12 
XVHLW"+RZZRXOG\RXXVHLW"´3OHDVHQRWHE did not prompt C as to how to use the object, 13 
i.e., she did not point to either pictureRUVD\HJ³PUHWHQGLW¶VDFDU´ Instead, children had 14 
to infer they should use the object as the other pictured object. 15 
Coding. All sessions were coded by the experimenter, who was also the first author. 16 
For each trial, it was coded whether the child performed an action corresponding to the actual 17 
object at hand (literal action), corresponding to the other pictured object (object substitution), 18 
or neither. A trained second observer, blind to the hypotheses of the study, independently 19 
coded 7 (16%) randomly chosen videos. Inter-rater agreement was very good, &RKHQ¶VNDSSD 20 
(k) = .82. 21 
Results 22 
Data for the percentage of trials children produced object substitutions (as a 23 
percentage of object substitution and literal actions combined) were positively skewed for the 24 
Model Phase of the Explicit Trying condition, and the Extension Phase of the Implicit Trying, 25 
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Implicit Pretense, and Explicit Trying conditions. However, data were negatively skewed for 1 
the Model Phase of the Implicit and Explicit Pretense conditions. Therefore, no 2 
transformations could normalize data, so we used Logit Mixed Effects Models (LMEM, see 3 
Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011 for more details). Models controlled for participant number and 4 
target objects. No effects of, or interactions with, age or gender were found. Children did not 5 
perform an object substitution or literal action for 6% of Model trials and 15% of Extension 6 
trials in the Implicit Pretend condition; 11% of Model trials and 11% of Extension trials in 7 
the Implicit Trying condition; and 2% of Extension trials in the Explicit Pretend condition. 8 
Figure 1 displays the mean percentage of trials in which children performed object 9 
substitutions (as a percentage of object substitution and literal actions combined), by 10 
Intention (Pretend, Trying), Cue (Implicit, Explicit), and Phase (Model, Extension). ³Other´ 11 
responses were not presented in this graph, which means the mean percentage of literal 12 
actions can be inferred from this graph by subtracting the mean numbers from 100. 13 
 14 
 15 
Figure 1. Percentage of trials children performed object substitutions (as a percentage of 16 
object substitution and literal actions combined), by Intention, Cue, and Phase in Study 1. 17 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Please note there is no bar for the Trying 18 
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Implicit Extension trials because the mean percentage of object substitution responses was 0 1 
(children only produced literal actions). 2 
 3 
The best model (loglik = -98.93, N = 339) was improved by Phase (Model, 4 
Extension), Ȥ2(1) = 122.18, p < .0001; Intention (Pretend, Trying), Ȥ2(1) = 24.84, p < .0001; 5 
and an interaction of Phase and Cue (Explicit, Implicit), Ȥ2(2) = 22.70, p < .0001. Children 6 
produced significantly more object substitution than literal actions in the Pretend condition 7 
than the Trying condition (Odds-Ratio, OR, = 2136.24, p < .0001); when Explicit versus 8 
Implicit cues were used (OR = 376.23, p = .0193); and in the Model phase than the Extension 9 
phase (OR = 53.21, p < .0001). There was an interaction between Cue and Phase (OR = 10 
2733.67, p = .0045). Children exposed to Explicit cues performed significantly more object 11 
substitutions in the Extension phase than children exposed to Implicit Cues. 12 
We followed up with planned analyses examining the Model and Extension Phases 13 
separately within the Implicit and Explicit groups. In the Model phase, children were 14 
significantly more likely to perform object substitutions in the Pretend condition compared to 15 
the Trying condition. This was the case both when Explicit (loglik = -24.55, N = 88, Ȥ2(1) = 16 
35.35, p < .0001, OR, = 8.46*e21, p = .0328), and Implicit cues were used (loglik = -25.05, N 17 
= 84, Ȥ2(1) = 17.16, p < .0001, OR, = 1.45*e7, p = .0219). In the Explicit group in the 18 
Extension phase children were marginally more likely to perform object substitutions in the 19 
Pretend condition than the Trying condition, (loglik = -31.66, N = 87, Ȥ2(1) = 7.91, p = .0049, 20 
OR, = 245.72, p = .0560). In the Implicit group the best model (loglik = -5.48, N = 80, Ȥ2(1) = 21 
0.003, p = .9549) was not improved by condition. This suggests the explicit cues helped 22 
children to continue performing object substitutions when no model was presented. 23 
We also coded whether children ever produced a novel object substitution. Zero out of 24 
11 did so in the Implicit Trying condition; 1 out of 11 in the Explicit Trying condition; 2 out 25 
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of 12 in the Implicit Pretending condition; and 8 out of 11 in the Explicit Pretending 1 
condition. A Kruskal-Wallis test found a significant difference between conditions, Ȥ2(3) = 2 
18.81, p < .001. While chi-square analyses found a significant majority of children in the 3 
Implicit Trying, Explicit Trying, and Implicit Pretending conditions did not produce object 4 
substitution during the extension trials, all Ȥ2(1) > 5.33, p < .022, there was no significant 5 
difference between the number of children who did and did not produce object substitution in 6 
the Explicit Pretending condition, Ȥ2(1) = 2.27, p =.132. 7 
Discussion 8 
In the extension phase, when children had no model to respond to, nor did they 9 
receive specific prompts to pretend in a certain way, children were marginally more likely to 10 
generate their own object substitutions when the goal of the game was to pretend, but only 11 
after receiving explicit cues. Additionally, significantly more children generated novel object 12 
substitutions at some point in the explicit pretend condition compared to the other conditions. 13 
However, while most children in the explicit pretend condition generated novel object 14 
substitutions, this was not a significant majority. Therefore, it is not the case that 3-year-olds 15 
as a group are capable of generating novel object substitutions, even though, as a group, they 16 
are marginally better at generating novel object substitutions in a pretend context compared 17 
to a trying context.  18 
During the model phase, children differentiated the intention to pretend (pretend 19 
condition) from the intention to do a literal action (trying condition). Children mostly 20 
corrected the mistakes an experimenter made, while imitating the object substitutions. 21 
However, children did not need explicit instructions to understand how to respond to the 22 
H[SHULPHQWHU¶VEHKDYLRr in the model phase. 23 
By extending the pretend or genuine actions in the Extension phase we argue that the 24 
child needs to understand the higher-level strategy to pretend (use object A as object B) or try 25 
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to perform the genuine action (use object A as object A). The finding that children in the 1 
Explicit group found it easier to extend the appropriate action provides further evidence that 2 
it is important for the child to understand this higher-order intention before they can act 3 
DSSURSULDWHO\DQGWKDWDQH[SOLFLWSURPSWWR³SUHWHQG´RU³WU\DQGXVHWKHREMHFW´DLGV in this 4 
understanding.  5 
Study 2 6 
Object substitution requires the ability to think of an alternative action or object to 7 
represent (divergent thinking), while at the same time inhibiting the original action one would 8 
do on or with that object (inhibitory control). Pretend play in naturalistic settings correlates 9 
with divergent thinking (e.g., Delvecchio, et al., 2016; Fehr & Russ, 2016; Hoffman & Russ, 10 
2016; Kaugars & Russ, 2009; Russ, et al., 1999; Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyver & Spence, 11 
1999). Dansky (1980) also found that children who pretended regularly during free play 12 
produced more responses in a verbal divergent thinking task, but only when they engaged in 13 
free play immediately prior to the task. This relationship was not found when children 14 
engaged in an imitation or convergent problem-solving task. This suggests that the 15 
relationship between pretend play and divergent thinking may not be as straightforward as 16 
some argue, and other factors should be taken into account as well. Inhibitory control 17 
sometimes correlates WRFKLOGUHQ¶Vpretend play (Kelly, et al., 2011), but sometimes not 18 
(Hopkins, et al., 2016). Study 2 sought to investigate whether divergent thinking and 19 
LQKLELWRU\FRQWUROFRUUHODWHZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶VQRYHOREMHFWVXEVWLWXWLRQLQDQH[SHULPHQWDO20 
setting.  21 
Most studies on pretend play focus either on investigating specific abilities using 22 
experimental designs (e.g., Hopkins, et al., 2016; Rakoczy, et al., 2004, 2006; Wyman, et al., 23 
2009) or detecting overall developmental patterns of pretend play using naturalistic settings 24 
(e.g., Belsky & Most, 1981; Howes & Matheson, 1992; Lillard & Witherington, 2004; Wyver 25 
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& Spence, 1999), but rarely have these two designs been assessed together. Kelly, et al. 1 
(2011) found spontaneous pretend play of 4- to 7-year-olds during free play correlated with 2 
scores on the Test of Pretend Play (Lewis & Boucher, 1997), which involves copying and 3 
carrying out verbally instructed pretend actions. Nakamichi (2015) found 18-month-ROGV¶4 
understanding of pretending during free play strongly correlated with Harris and 5 
.DYDQDXJK¶V7HGG\WDVNDWPRQWKV6WXG\VRXJKWWRLQYHVWLJDWHZKHWKHUWKH6 
UHVXOWVIURPRXUSUHWHQGH[SHULPHQWZHUHLQGLFDWLYHRIFKLOGUHQ¶VSUHWHQGSOD\EHKDYLRULQD7 
naturalistic setting. 8 
Method 9 
Participants. We ran a power analysis for our most conservative test, the Wilcoxon 10 
Signed-ranks test, which found we required 32 children with Į = 0.05, ȕ = 0.80, and a large 11 
effect size, w = 0.5, (Faul, et al., 2007). Thirty-four 3-year-olds (19 males, mean age = 42 12 
months; range = 36 - 48 months; SD = 3.8 months) participated. Most children were British 13 
and Caucasian, and parents had attained a high school diploma (22%), an undergraduate 14 
degree (33%), or a postgraduate degree (44%). Participants were recruited as in Study 1. 15 
Ethical approval and consent was the same as Study 1. 16 
Materials, Procedure, and Coding.  17 
Pretend experiment. The materials, procedure and coding were identical to the 18 
Explicit condition of Study 1, except that children participated in both the Pretend and Trying 19 
conditions on different days (see design). Seven participants (20%) were coded for the 20 
Pretend condition by a second coder blind to the hypotheses of the study. Another seven 21 
(20%) were coded for the Trying condition. Agreement was very good, k = 0.91. 22 
Unusual Box Test (UBT, divergent thinking). The materials and procedure used for 23 
the UBT are described in Bijvoet-van den Berg and Hoicka (2014). We chose to use a 24 
physical measure of divergent thinking as the pretend tasks were also physical. There are 25 
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only two physical divergent thinking tests validated for 3-year-olds: the Thinking Creatively 1 
in Action and Movement test (TCAM; Torrance, 1981), and the UBT. We chose not to use 2 
the TCAM as some of the trials involve pretending, which would mean we would be 3 
correlating pretending with pretending. The UBT is physical, but does not involve 4 
pretending. The UBT has good test-retest reliability in children as young as 1 year (Bijvoet-5 
van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014; Hoicka, et al., 2016). It has also been validated against the 6 
TCAM and the verbal Instances subtest of the Wallach and Kogan tests of creativity (Wallach 7 
& Kogan, 1965). The child was presented with a wooden box with an open top containing 8 
several features (e.g., rings, stairs, hole), which was placed on a turn table. E showed all the 9 
features on the box while turning the box. After C was given a chance to turn the box, s/he 10 
received one of five novel objects (egg holder, spatula, feather roller, Kong rubber toy, hook) 11 
to play with together with the box for 90 seconds each. E sat on the side and interacted 12 
minimally with C. 13 
Divergent thinking scores were calculated by counting the number of different actions 14 
C performed for all trials combined (5 x 90 seconds). Actions were coded on two features: 15 
what type of action was performed (e.g., hit, place) and what part of the box was used during 16 
the action (e.g., stairs, rings). Seven participants (20%) were coded by a second coder blind to 17 
the hypotheses of the study. Agreement was good, Intraclass correlation = 0.76, p = .027. 18 
Day-Night task (inhibitory control). Inhibitory control was assessed using the Day-19 
Night task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994). Fourteen pictures were used. Half showed a 20 
yellow sun on a light blue background. The other half showed a white moon and four stars on 21 
a black background. E started with two practice trials in which she explained that when 22 
presented with a moon card C had to respond with the word ³GD\´ When presented with a 23 
sun card C KDGWRUHVSRQGZLWKWKHZRUG³QLJKW.´ During two practice trials, E presented a 24 
sun and a moon card. If C responded incorrectly, E explained the rules again and gave 25 
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another two practice trials. After that, 14 test trials (seven sun cards and seven moon cards) 1 
were presented to C in a pseudorandom order (see Gerstadt, et al., 1994). E always asked, 2 
³:KDWGR\RXVD\IRUWKLVRQH"´EXWQRRWKHUIHHGEDFNZDVJLYHQ &¶V answers were written 3 
down by E during the task, and afterwards coded for being correct or incorrect. A correct 4 
answer was when C VDLG³GD\´ when presented with a moon FDUGDQG³QLJKW´ when 5 
presented with a sun card. Any other responses were counted as incorrect. 6 
 Free play. E told C that she was interested in seeing how well s/he could play on 7 
his/her own. This was to inhibit &¶V desire to play together with E. E sat approximately two 8 
meters away and acted busy. Thirty-six objects were used, divided equally over three 5-9 
minute sessions. Half of the objects were of indiscriminate shape and function whereas the 10 
other half were functionally specific. Figure 2 displays the toys used for each session. The 11 
toys were presented to C on a plastic tray (30x40cm). C was given up to 5 minutes to play 12 
with the toys, with a minimum play time of 2 minutes. If C clearly stated after 2 minutes that 13 
s/he was finished playing with the toys, E replaced the toys with new ones.  14 
&¶V behavior during free play was coded using Observer XT. A hierarchical system 15 
was used, based on the Exploratory Behavior Scale by Van Schijndel, Franse, and Raijmakers 16 
(2010). The lowest behavior level was No Pretense. The next level was Autosymbolic 17 
Pretense, in which C used the object for its original purpose in a pretend-like fashion (e.g., 18 
pretending to pour tea from teapot). The third level was Object Substitution Pretense in which 19 
C pretended an object was something else (e.g., pretending a stick was a spoon). Appendix D 20 
gives a description of the levels, and examples of behaviors. Behavior was coded during 5 21 
second intervals. The highest level of behavior that C demonstrated per time interval was 22 
coded (Van Schijndel, et al., 2010). For example, when within one interval C did both 23 
autosymbolic pretending, and no pretending, the interval was coded as autosymbolic 24 
pretending. A maximum number of 180 intervals were coded (60 intervals x 3 sessions). The 25 
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frequency of intervals that children spent in autosymbolic pretend play and object substitution 1 
were used for analyses1. Six participants (18%) were coded by a second coder blind to the 2 
hypotheses of the study. Agreement was very good, k = 0.84. 3 
 4 
A) Pretend Session      B) Functional Session 5 
 6 
C) Combined Session 7 
Figure 2. Toys used for the three sessions of free play. A) Pretend session ± Functionally 8 
specific toys (FST): stuffed toy animal dog and rabbit, teapot with lid, cup and saucer. 9 
Indiscriminate function toys (IFT): three sponges of different shapes, three closed-off tubes 10 
with ridges. B) Functional session - FST: xylophone, hammer, shape sorter with lid, two 11 
                                                 
1
 Not all children completed 180 intervals (N = 10). When children clearly stated they were finished playing, the 
session was stopped. Initially, we controlled for the variance in number of intervals by dividing the frequency of 
behavior by the total number of play intervals. However, no differences in analyses were found when using this 
measure. Therefore, for simplicity, we continued using frequency instead of relative frequencies.  
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blocks (heart and flower shape) that fit in the shape sorter. IFT: two round shaped pegs and a 1 
block to place them in, three Duplo blocks. C) Combined session ± FST: bucket, shovel, fish-2 
shaped sand shaper, two miniature plastic dolls (a lady and a little girl). IFT: shoe lace, three 3 
plastic cotton reels, three wooden blocks of different shapes (rectangle, round and rainbow 4 
shape). 5 
 6 
Design. This study was a within-subjects design in which children completed all 7 
tasks. For the 21 children who participated in their nursery, the tasks were administered in 8 
four sessions (the Day-Night task was administered together with one of the other tasks). The 9 
other 13 children completed the tasks in two sessions, for the convenience of the parents. 10 
Testing order was counterbalanced. The Pretend condition was deliberately not combined 11 
ZLWKWKHIUHHSOD\VHVVLRQRUWKH7U\LQJFRQGLWLRQWRDYRLGWKHFKLOG¶VEehavior in the pretend 12 
condition influencing his/her behavior on the other tasks or vice versa. 13 
Children were never presented with the same objects in the Pretend and Trying 14 
conditions. For the UBT, the order of objects given to children was counterbalanced, 15 
following Bijvoet-van den Berg and Hoicka (2014). For the free play session, the toys were 16 
given in three possible orders (Order 1: Pretend (P) ± Functional (F) ± Combined (C); Order 17 
2: F ± C ± P; Order 3: C ± P ± F), which were counterbalanced across children.  18 
Results 19 
Data for the percentage of trials children produced object substitutions (as a 20 
percentage of object substitution and literal actions combined) were positively skewed for the 21 
Extension phase of the Trying condition, but negatively skewed for the Model phase of the 22 
Pretense condition. Therefore, no transformations could normalize data, so we used LMEM. 23 
Children did not perform an object substitution or literal action for 8% of Model trials and 24 
3% of Extension trials in the Pretense condition; and 6% of Model trials and 4% of Extension 25 
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trials in the Trying condition. Figure 3 displays the percentage of trials for which children 1 
performed object substitutions (as a percentage of object substitution and literal actions 2 
combined), by Intention (Pretend, Trying), and Phase (Model, Extension). 3 
 4 
Figure 3. Percentage of trials children performed object substitutions (as a percentage of 5 
object substitution and literal actions combined), by Intention and Phase, in Study 2. Bars 6 
represent 95% confidence intervals.  7 
The best model (loglik = -216.29, N = 514) was improved by Intention (Pretend, 8 
Trying), Ȥ2(1) = 114.35, p < .0001; and Phase (Model, Extension) Ȥ2(1) = 102.66, p < .0001.  9 
Children were significantly more likely to perform object substitutions than literal actions in 10 
the Pretend versus Trying condition (OR = 27.31, p < .0001); and in the Model versus 11 
Extension phase (OR = 16.73, p < .0001). 12 
We followed up with planned analyses examining the Model and Extension phases 13 
separately. The best model for the Model phase (loglik = -134.28, N = 262, Ȥ2(1) = 73.39, p < 14 
.0001) found children were significantly more likely to perform object substitutions than 15 
literal actions in the Pretend than Trying condition (OR = 20.07, p < .0001). The best model 16 
for the Extension phase (loglik = -74.59, N = 252, Ȥ2(1) = 84.86, p < .0001) found children 17 
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were significantly more likely to perform object substitution than literal actions in the Pretend 1 
than Trying condition (OR = 477.47, p < .0001). 2 
We also coded whether children ever produced a novel object substitution within each 3 
condition. Two out of 34 children did so in the Trying condition, and 20 out of 34 in the 4 
Pretend condition. A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test found a significant difference between 5 
conditions, Ȥ2(2) = 4.24, p < .001. While chi-square analyses found a significant majority of 6 
children in the Trying condition did not pretend during the Extension phase, Ȥ2(1) = 26.47, p 7 
< .001, there was no significant difference between the number of children who did and did 8 
not pretend in the Pretend condition, Ȥ2(1) = 1.06, p =.303. 9 
Divergent thinking, inhibitory control, and free play. We ran correlations between 10 
the number of object substitutions in the modeling and extension phases of the Pretend 11 
condition (separately) and: divergent thinking, inhibitory control, object substitution during 12 
free play, autosymbolic play during free play, and age. Table 3 shows the means, ranges, and 13 
confidence intervals of the variables (age is in the participant section). One child did not 14 
complete the free play task, and another child did not complete the inhibitory control task.  15 
 16 
Table 3.  17 
Descriptive statistics for the number of object substitutions performed in the model and 18 
extension phases of the experiment; divergent thinking scores; inhibitory control scores; and 19 
the number of free play intervals involving object substitution and autosymbolic pretense. 20 
 N Mean Range Confidence Interval 
Experiment: Model Trials 34 2.97 0-4 2.54-3.40 
Experiment: Extension Trials 34 1.41 0-4 0.87-1.95 
Divergent Thinking 34 26.03 16-38 23.98-28.08 
Inhibitory Control 33 8.67 1-16 6.77-10.57 
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Free Play: Object Substitution 33 2.52 0-9 1.47-3.56 
Free Play: Autosymbolic Pretense  33 12.64 0-48 9.08-16.20 
Since the number of object substitutions in the Model phase was negatively skewed, 1 
and the number of object substitutions in the extension phase, as well as the number of 2 
autosymbolic pretend intervals in free play, ZHUHSRVLWLYHO\VNHZHG6SHDUPDQ¶V5KRZDV3 
XVHGIRUFRUUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHVHYDULDEOHV7KHUHPDLQLQJFRUUHODWLRQVXVHG3HDUVRQ¶Vr. Table 4 
4 shows positive relationships between object substitution during the Model and Extension 5 
phases of the experiment (p = .009), object substitution during free play and divergent 6 
thinking (p = .030), and divergent thinking and age (p = .007). We followed up with a partial 7 
correlation between object substitution during free play and divergent thinking, controlling 8 
for age, which was significant (r = .403, p = .022). 9 
 10 
Table 4.  11 
Correlations between object substitution during the modeling and extension phases of the 12 
experiment, divergent thinking, inhibitory control, object substitution and autosymbolic 13 
pretense during free play, and age. 6SHDUPDQ¶V5KRLVXVHGIRUDOOFRUUHODWLRQVZLWKREMHFW14 
substitution during both modeling and extension phases of the experiment and autosymbolic 15 
pretense GXULQJIUHHSOD\3HDUVRQ¶VUZDVXVHGIRUWKHUHPDLQLQJDQDO\VHV 16 
 Experiment: 
Extension 
Trials 
Divergent 
Thinking 
Inhibitory 
Control 
Free Play: 
Object 
Substitution 
Free Play: 
Autosymbolic 
Pretense 
Age 
Experiment: 
Modeling 
Trials 
.441** 
N = 34 
-.014 
N = 34 
-.195 
N = 33 
-.084 
N = 33 
.000 
N = 33 
.154 
N = 34 
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Experiment: 
Extension 
Trials 
 .049 
N = 34 
.048 
N = 33 
-.138 
N = 33 
-.127 
N = 33 
.200 
N = 34 
Divergent 
Thinking 
  -.197 
N = 33 
.378* 
N = 33 
.028 
N = 33 
.451** 
N = 34 
Inhibitory 
Control 
   -.060 
N = 32 
.098 
N = 32 
-.058 
N = 33 
Free Play: 
Object 
Substitution 
    .211 
N = 33 
.052 
N = 33 
Free Play: 
Autosymbolic 
Pretense 
     -.293 
N = 33 
*p < .05, **p < .01 1 
 2 
Discussion 3 
Study 2 replicated the results for the explicit conditions in Study 1 using a repeated-4 
measures design. Children generated significantly more novel object substitutions when the 5 
goal was to pretend. Children also distinguished the H[SHULPHQWHU¶VLQWHQWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH6 
pretend and trying conditions. Additionally, while most children generated novel object 7 
substitutions in the pretend condition, this did not reach a significant majority. 8 
1HLWKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VFRSLHGQRUQovel object substitutions during the pretense 9 
experiment were related to divergent thinking, inhibitory control, the frequency of object 10 
substitution during free play, the frequency of autosymbolic play during free play, nor age, 11 
although they did correlate with each other. These results contradict previous literature 12 
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reporting a relationship between pretend play and divergent thinking (e.g., Delvecchio, et al., 1 
2016; Fehr & Russ, 2016; Hoffman & Russ, 2016; Kaugars & Russ, 2009; Russ, et al., 1999; 2 
Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyver & Spence, 1999), and between pretend play and inhibitory 3 
control (Kelly, et al., 2011). Instead, our results are consistent with 'DQVN\¶VILQGLQJ4 
that pretend play and divergent thinking are not necessarily related, and with +RSNLQV¶DQG5 
FROOHDJXHV¶ILQGLQJVWKDWLQKLELWRU\FRQWURODQGREMHFWVXEVWLWXtion are not necessarily 6 
related.  7 
Although we did use a non-verbal measure of divergent thinking instead of a verbal 8 
measure, it is unlikely this could explain why no relationship was found between responses in 9 
the pretend experiment and divergent thinking. Bijvoet-van den Berg and Hoicka (2014) 10 
found high correlations between the UBT and verbal measures of divergent thinking, which 11 
suggests that they measure similar constructs. Furthermore, one could argue that a non-12 
verbal, action-based, measure of divergent thinking would be better comparable to the action-13 
based pretend experiment and therefore, if any relationship would be found it would be more 14 
likely to be significant using the non-verbal measure. 15 
It is interesting to note that the correlation between object substitution in the 16 
H[SHULPHQWDODQGIUHHSOD\VWXGLHVZHUHQRWFRUUHODWHG7KLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLQDELOLW\17 
to generate object substitutions in an experimental settings does not necessarily mean that 18 
they do not show object substitution in a free play setting, or vice versa. 19 
General Discussion 20 
Generating Novel Object Substitutions 21 
Our studies show children generate object substitutions without the use of a model or 22 
specific prompts, and with objects different in function to the target pretend object. Children 23 
were significantly more likely to do so within an explicit pretend context, rather than a trying 24 
context, or an implicit pretend context. The results from both studies dismiss the possibility 25 
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WKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VSUHWHQGUHVSRQVHV can only be caused by imitating the experimenter or through 1 
verbally prompting a specific pretend action (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Hopkins, et 2 
al., 2016; Rakoczy, et al., 2004; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006; Wyman, et al., 2009). This 3 
research converges with findings that young children can create their own novel iconic 4 
gestures (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014); create their own novel jokes (Hoicka & 5 
Akhtar, 2011); and generate their own novel actions (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014; 6 
Hoicka, et al., 2016; Hoicka, et al., 2017). Therefore, this research strengthens the notion that 7 
children are not only social learners, but can also think for themselves.  8 
However, some caution should be taken as while most children in the explicit pretend 9 
conditions in both studies produced novel acts of object substitution, this was not a 10 
significant majority, suggesting many 3-year-olds still struggle with this ability. Interestingly, 11 
this may be consistent with past research. While Rakoczy, et al. (2004) found 3-year-olds 12 
were significantly more likely to extend autosymbolic pretense acts within a pretend 13 
intentional context compared to a trying context, they only did so around 50% of the time, 14 
and no information was given about the number of children who ever extended the pretend 15 
acts, making it unclear whether most 3-year-olds can do so. Similarly, while Hoicka and 16 
Akhtar (2011) found 2- and 3-year-olds were significantly more likely to invent jokes within 17 
a humorous intentional context compared to a sincere context, they only did so around 40-18 
50% of the time, and no information was given about the number of children who ever 19 
invented jokes. Finally, while Behne, et al., (2014) found 2-year-olds were significantly more 20 
likely to generate novel iconic gestures in a communicative versus non-communicative 21 
context, they only did so around 35% of the time. Furthermore, while 58% of children ever 22 
created a novel iconic gesture, no chi-square analysis was done, and our own analysis (14/24 23 
children) found it would be non-significant. Therefore, while children as a group produce 24 
novel acts in appropriate contexts significantly more often than they do in control contexts, 25 
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these findings suggest that most children, as a group, may not actually be able to generate 1 
novel non-literal acts. This is striking as one of the key tenets of pretend play is that it 2 
supposed to be a creative act (e.g., Fehr & Russ, 2016; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Hoffmann 3 
& Russ, 2016; Russ, et al., 1999; Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyman, et al., 2009). Instead, ours 4 
and other research suggests that pretend play may be primarily imitative in nature, at least for 5 
children 3 years and under, which fits well with research suggesting pretend play has a 6 
normative function (Hoicka & Martin, 2016; Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman, et al., 2009). This also 7 
suggests that while children start to use object substitution from 2 years (Belsky & Most, 8 
1981; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; McCune-Nicolich, 1981), many 3-year-olds may still not 9 
be able to cognitively plan and enact the representation of one object as another. Study 2 10 
shows this is not due to problems with divergent thinking or inhibitory control, but it could 11 
perhaps be linked to general planning skills or cognitive flexibility, which are still developing 12 
in 3-year-olds (Blakey & Carroll, 2018; Welsh, et al., 1991). Future research should consider 13 
these discrepancies in more detail, and consider the individual differences which drive these 14 
results. It should also examine performance in 4-year-olds, for whom executive functions are 15 
more developed. 16 
When children were shown pretend rather than trying actions in the model phase, they 17 
were more likely to generate object substitutions in the extension phase. This is congruent 18 
with previous findings that children produce more pretend actions after seeing a pretend 19 
model (e.g., Fiese, 1990; Nielsen & Christie, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2006). In the introduction 20 
we mentioned that children may have used deferred imitation to guide their object 21 
substitution. In our experiment, deferred imitation is an improbable explanation since the 22 
objects in the extension phase were unrelated to the objects in the model phase; nor were they 23 
acts of object substitution children were likely to have seen before. 24 
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Both studies found children performed more object substitutions during the model 1 
phase than the extension phase. One possibility is that imitating object substitutions requires 2 
fewer cognitive skills than generating object substitutions. However, our study found that 3 
generating object substitutions did not relate to either inhibitory control or divergent thinking, 4 
so if this is the case, other cognitive skills must be at play, e.g., planning (Harris, 1993). 5 
Additionally, pretend play is often a social encounter (Shim, Herwig, & Shelly, 2001). 6 
Therefore, children might find it easier to affiliate with someone else engaged in pretense 7 
than generating these actions without a partner. 8 
Intentions to Produce Object Substitution 9 
Both naturalistic and experimental research has focused on whether children 10 
understand that, while pretending, adults intentionally perform wrong actions. In naturalistic 11 
settings, parents gave specific cues to indicate they were pretending (e.g., exaggerated 12 
movements, sound effects, reinforcing actions through language and repetition, increased 13 
infant-directed speech; Hoicka, 2016; Hoicka & Butcher, 2016; Lillard & Witherington, 14 
2004, Nakamichi, 2015). When experimenters used similar cues, 3-year-olds distinguished 15 
autosymbolic pretend actions (e.g., writing with capped pen) and trying actions (when the 16 
experimenter intended to do a correct action; Rakoczy, et al., 2004). Our studies indicate 3-17 
year-olds understand the intentions behind object substitutions as well, and that they 18 
differentiate these intentions from mistakes. Our results resemble the findings by Rakoczy, et 19 
al., (2004), suggesting children are good at understanding the intentions behind both 20 
autosymbolic play and object substitution. The extra difficulty of having to suppress the 21 
initial motor response, and generate an entirely different motor response during object 22 
substitution, GRHVQRWH[SXQJHFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGthe intentions behind pretense. 23 
One possibility is that instead of children understanding the intentions to pretend, they 24 
instead responded to emotional cues (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). In the pretend condition, the 25 
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experimenter was positive, and in the trying condition, the experimenter was negative. 1 
Therefore, children may have copied actions marked with positive emotion, and avoided 2 
actions marked with negative emotions. However, given that children in our study also 3 
generated significantly more novel pretend actions in the pretend intentional context, this 4 
suggests children really did understand the intentional context. This is because children could 5 
not simply imitate in the extension trials, and instead had to generate novel pretense, 6 
demonstrating an underlying understanding of pretense. Additionally, they only did so in the 7 
H[SOLFLWFRQGLWLRQVXJJHVWLQJWKHZRUG³SUHWHQG´ZDVLPSRUWDQWQRWMXVWWKHHPRWLRQDOFXHV 8 
However, given that most children, but not a significant majority of children, produced novel 9 
object substitutions in the explicit pretend condition, it is possible that some children relied 10 
on an emotion-based rule of imitating/avoiding, while others understood the underlying 11 
intentions. 12 
Experimental vs. Naturalistic Settings  13 
2XUUHVXOWVLQGLFDWHWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLPLWDWion and generation of object substitution in 14 
an experimental setting does not relate to pretense during free play. This contradicts findings 15 
by Kelly, et al. (2011) who found a positive relationship between experimental and 16 
naturalistic pretend play. However, in the Kelly, et al. study the free play session always 17 
followed the experimental task. Therefore, children may have been primed to continue 18 
pretending in the free play session, leading to a correlation due to order effects. In contrast, if 19 
children had done the free play task first, perhaps they would not have been primed to 20 
pretend, leading to a null result. In contrast, our experimental and free play tasks were run on 21 
different days in counterbalanced order. 22 
Our results also contradict the findings that the more toddlers smiled and pretended 23 
(combined) at 18 months, the higher they scored on a pretend task at 24 months that involved 24 
following instructions to pretend (Nakamichi, 2015). However, it is possible that toddlers 25 
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imitated pretending at 18 months (as free play involved mothers being instructed to perform 1 
specific pretend actions), and that imitating pretense at 18 months related to following verbal 2 
instructions at 24 months. In contrast, while the modeling phase of our experiment involved 3 
imitation, the extension phase relied completely on novel object substitution, while our free 4 
play study offered no modeling or instruction. Therefore, perhaps socially learned pretending 5 
in free play and experimental settings correlate, but novel pretending does not.  6 
WKDWZHVHHLQ\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VHYHU\GD\EHKDYLRUPD\QRWPDWFKRXU7 
conceptualization of pretending as being imaginative and boundless. While our experiments 8 
and other studies (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2016) show 3-year-olds can produce object 9 
substitutions which are very different in function to the original object, it may not be that 10 
object substitution in everyday life is performed this way. Our results suggest we should be 11 
careful to interpret findings from experiments as being reflective of how children would 12 
respond in a naturalistic setting. Future studies should consider the possible discrepancy 13 
between experimental and naturalistic behavior. More research is needed in which 14 
experimental and naturalistic behaviors are directly compared. 15 
Object Substitution and Cognition 16 
Divergent thinking had no relation with how well children either copied or generated 17 
object substitution during the experiment in Study 2. However, we did find a moderately 18 
strong positive correlation between divergent thinking and object substitution during free 19 
play, extending previous findings which found this relationship from 4 years onwards (e.g., 20 
Delvecchio, et al., 2016; Fehr & Russ, 2016; Hoffman & Russ, 2016; Kaugars & Russ, 2009; 21 
Russ, et al., 1999; Wallace & Russ, 2015; Wyver & Spence, 1999). One possibility is that 22 
long term memory is linked to both divergent thinking and deferred imitation (Gilhooly, 23 
Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Meltzoff & Moore, 1994). Therefore, children with better 24 
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long term memory may have use deferred imitation to generate more object substitutions 1 
during free play, and also to generate more ideas for the divergent thinking test.  2 
Inhibitory control had no relationship with FKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRimitate or generate 3 
object substitutions, either in experimental or naturalistic settings. This contradicts previous 4 
ILQGLQJVWKDWLQKLELWRU\FRQWUROLVUHODWHGWRFKLOGUHQ¶VV\PEROLFSOD\VNLOOV.HOO\, et al., 5 
2011), and instead confirms that the link between inhibitory control and object substitution is 6 
tenuous (Hopkins, et al., 2016). One possible explanation is that in a cooperative pretend 7 
setting, where the adult models the pretend action, children do not need to inhibit the original 8 
action associated with the object, but instead enter a mode where they can by-pass their own 9 
knowledge of the object, and use it in a collective way as a pretend object. However, it is 10 
XQFOHDUZK\LQKLELWRU\FRQWUROZRXOGVWLOOQRWFRUUHODWHZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶VRZQREMHFW11 
substitutions as these would need to be figured out by children on their own. 12 
Conclusion 13 
The results suggest 3-year-olds are able to create novel pretend actions. They are 14 
more likely to generate their own object substitutions within a pretend than trying context. 15 
They do not require a model or prompts for specific pretend actions from an experimenter to 16 
do so. Explicit instructions that emphasize the goal to pretend IXUWKHUDLGVFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\Wo 17 
generate object substitution. Additionally, children differentiate between an H[SHULPHQWHU¶V18 
intentions to pretend or to try (but fail) to perform a literal DFWLRQ+RZHYHUFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\19 
to copy or generate object substitutions during the experiment was not related to their 20 
divergent thinking skills, inhibitory control, nor pretense during free play. Future studies 21 
focused on experimentally testing pretend play abilities in children should consider how these 22 
may relate to pretense in naturalistic settings. Finally, while most children in the explicit 23 
pretend condition generated novel object substitutions, it was not a significant majority, 24 
suggesting individual differences still exist in this age range.  
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Appendix A 1 
Order of object pairs used in the Test Phase of the pretend experiments in Studies 1 and 2. 2 
Order 1 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Ball Cup 
 
Piano Camera 
 
Hat Glove 
 
Toothbrush Whistle 
Extension Hammer Brush 
 Shaker Pen 
 Soap Glasses 
 Phone Drum 
 
Order 2 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Hammer Brush 
 
Shaker Pen 
 
Soap Glasses 
 
Phone Drum 
Extension Ball Cup 
 
Piano Camera 
 
Hat Glove 
 
Toothbrush Whistle 
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Order 3 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Cup Ball 
 
Camera  Piano 
 
Glove Hat 
 
Whistle Toothbrush 
Extension Brush Hammer 
 Pen Shaker 
 Glasses Soap 
 Drum Phone 
Order 4 
Phase Object Presented Other picture 
Model Brush Hammer 
 
Pen Shaker 
 
Glasses Soap 
 
Drum Phone 
Extension Cup Ball 
 Camera  Piano 
 Glove Hat 
 Whistle Toothbrush 
 1 
  2 
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Appendix B 1 
Pictures of objects used in the pretend experiments in Studies 1 and 2 2 
Familiarization Phase: 3 
    4 
Test Phase: 5 
     6 
     7 
     8 
     9 
  10 
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Appendix C 1 
Actions performed on each object, and sounds effects made in the Pretend Condition 2 
Object 
Presented 
Target 
Object 
Action Sound Effects 
Pretending 
Ball Cup Holding the ball in a way you would normally 
hold a cup and bringing the ball to the mouth, as 
though to drink from it. 
Slurping, as if 
drinking from 
a cup 
Cup Ball Taking the cup in two hands and holding it a bit 
above the table, in a way you would normally hold 
a ball before bouncing it. Then bouncing the cup 
on the table. 
³%RLQJ
%RLQJ´± as if 
bouncing a 
ball 
Piano Camera Holding the piano with one hand on each side, in a 
way you would normally hold a camera. Bringing 
the piano to the eye, as if looking through the 
viewfinder. Then pressing with one finger on top 
of the piano, as if taking a picture. 
³&OLFNFOLFN´ 
Camera Piano Placing the camera flat on the table, then moving 
hands from left to right over the camera, while 
moving fingers as if playing piano. 
Singing 
melody as if 
playing a tune 
Hat Glove Holding the hat in one hand, while holding the 
other hand above the table with fingers spread. 
Sliding the hat over the hand from fingers to wrist, 
then letting go of the hat and looking at the hat on 
the hand. 
³2KKKK´± as 
if admiring 
how pretty the 
glove is 
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Glove Hat Picking up the glove with two hands, in a way you 
would normally hold a hat. Placing the glove on 
top of the head, and holding hands to the side as if 
showing off the hat 
³2KKKK´± as 
if admiring 
how pretty the 
hat is 
Toothbrush Whistle Picking up the toothbrush with two hands, in a 
way you would normally hold a whistle. Bringing 
the toothbrush to the mouth and moving fingers as 
if playing. 
Singing 
melody as if 
playing a tune 
Whistle Toothbrush Bringing the whistle a short distance in front of 
the mouth in a way you would normally hold a 
toothbrush. Opening mouth so that teeth are 
visible, then moving hand from left to right in 
front of teeth. 
³6KKKVKKK
VKKK´± like 
the sound of 
the toothbrush 
on the teeth 
Hammer Brush Holding the hammer in one hand, in a way you 
would normally hold a hair brush. Bringing the 
hammer to the hair and moving hand up and down 
over the hair, as if brushing it.  
³6KKVKK´± as 
the sound a 
hair brush 
makes when 
going through 
hair 
Brush Hammer Holding the brush with the bristles to the side, in a 
way you would normally hold a hammer. Banging 
the brush three times on the table. 
The banging 
sound of the 
brush against 
the table 
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Shaker Pen Holding the shaker in a way you would normally 
hold a pen. Making movements with the end of 
the shaker on the table as if writing. 
³2KKKK´± as 
if admiring 
what was 
written 
Pen Shaker Holding the pen with writing end firmly in one 
hand in a way you would normally hold a shaker. 
Shaking pen quickly on one side of the body, then 
moving hand to other side and making another 
shaking movement. 
³&KD-FKD´± 
as the sound a 
shaker makes 
when shaking 
it 
Soap Glasses Picking up the soap with one hand on each side. 
Bringing the soap to face on the top of the nose, 
covering the eyes. Moves head from left to right 
and back as if looking through glasses.  
³2KKKK´± as 
if admiring the 
view through 
the glasses 
Glasses Soap Holding the glasses (closed) in one hand. Moving 
other hand over the glasses, then placing it in the 
other hand and moving the spare hand over the 
glasses, as if washing hands with soap. 
³/DODOD´± as 
if enjoying 
washing hands 
Phone Drum Placing the phone flat on the table, then hitting 
phone in turns with both hand on the phone. 
Banging 
sound of the 
hands on the 
phone 
Drum Phone Taking the drum in one hand by the rim. With the 
other hand, using the index finger to hit the drum 
as if pressing buttons on a phone. Then bringing 
the drum to one ear. 
³+HOOR"´
when bringing 
the drum to 
the ear 
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Appendix D 1 
'HVFULSWLRQRIOHYHOVRIEHKDYLRUDQGH[DPSOHVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUDWHDFKOHYHO 2 
Level 1: No Pretense 3 
A child does not interact with any objects; or touches, holds, transports, or manipulates an 4 
object in an active and attentive manner. 5 
- A girl holds her hand on the xylophone, while talking to her mother. 6 
- A girl places blocks on top of each other, building a tower. 7 
- A boy pulls a red bendy stick on both sides so that it extends, then pushes on both 8 
sides so that it contracts. 9 
Level 2: Autosymbolic 10 
A child uses an object in a way that is normally used, but he or she attributes features to the 11 
object which are not present, or pretends inanimate objects are animate. The pretend act can 12 
be accompanied by sound effects or words explaining the pretend setting. 13 
- A girl uses a sponge to wash the dog stuffed animal (no water present). 14 
- A boy pours imaginary tea from teapot into cup (no tea present). 15 
- A girl brings two puppets with their faces close together, and makes kissing sounds. 16 
Level 3: Object Substitution 17 
A child uses an object as if it is something else. The pretend act can be accompanied by 18 
sound effects or words explaining the pretend setting. 19 
- A boy takes a red bendy stick and holds it in the cup while stirring it around in the cup 20 
like a spoon. 21 
- A girl holds the blue, snakelike, sponge in one hand and pulls on the cord attached to 22 
WKHVSRQJHZLWKKHURWKHUKDQGZKLOHVD\LQJ³,WLVDFDWDSXOW´ 23 
- A girl takes a puppet and places it near the blocks that are stacked like a house, while 24 
VD\LQJ³7KLVLVWKHJLUO¶V KRXVH´ 25 
